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be given authority to determine whether the insurer should accept
a compromise offer. And, in jurisdictions where pre-trial examinations are not available, some type of hearing could be conducted
whereby selected and highly-qualified individuals would similarly
judge the merits of the insurer's defense. In making this determination, the questions of proper investigation by the insurer
and comparative financial risks should be carefully considered.
Under such a system, whenever the designated party concludes that the insurer should compromise the claim rather
than litigate and the injured party is willing to accept an amount
within the policy limit, a refusal by the insurer to heed the recommendation should render it strictly liable for any excess amount
of a subsequent judgment rendered against the insured.
If liability to the injured party has already been established
after a trial on the merits, and there are no substantial questions
as to the insured's liability which may provide the basis of an
appeal, the insurer should not be allowed with impunity to seek reversal of the judgment on a collateral issue which does not bear
directly on liability when the injured party is willing to negotiate
a settlement offer within the policy limit. Where the insurer
knows that the finder of fact has already decided against him on
the question of the insured's liability, it should not be able to
gamble the insured's money by seeking reversal on a technicality
in the hope that a subsequent trial on the issue of liability will
reach a different conclusion.
These proposals will limit the application of the "bad faith" rule
to litigation on the undetermined question of liability for which
the insurer has obtained official approval. Also limited would
be the confusion inherent in the "bad faith" rule, i.e., whether
the insurer reasonably considered the interests of the insured when
it failed to accept a settlement offer.

ATTORNEY'S WORK-PRODUCT PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL COURTs

The "sporting theory of justice," which long prevailed in our
judicial system, has been rejected in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure relating to discovery.1 The purpose of the rules is to
assure a correct and speedy result on the merits. Discovery
facilitates this end in that it tends to narrow the issues; to leave
for trial only those issues actually contested; to insure that all
relevant evidence will be adduced at the trial; to expose fraudulent
and groundless claims; and to serve as a basis for pretrial settle' Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 1958).
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ments. According to rule 26(b), "any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action" is subject to discovery. 2 One privilege created by the
courts is the attorney's "work-product" privilege.3 The work product of an attorney is protected in order to preserve our adversary
system of litigation by assuring counsel that his private files will
not be available to his adversary unless justification and necessity
are shown.4 This note will analyze the scope of the "work-product"
privilege as it now exists in the federal courts and the collateral
questions of "good cause" and appealability.
The Work-Product Privilege
Perhaps the most important case relevant to the work-product
privilege is Hickman v. Taylor.5 On February 7, 1943, a tugboat
sank while helping to tow a car-float across a river. Five crewmen
died in the accident. Three days later, the tug owners employed
an attorney to defend them in any litigation that might arise out
of this accident. On March 4, 1943, the United States Steamboat
Inspectors held a public hearing at which the four survivors were
examined. This testimony was recorded and made available to all
interested parties. Shortly thereafter, the attorney for the tug
owners interviewed and obtained signed statements relating to the
accident from the survivors. He also interviewed other persons
believed to have some information relating to the sinking and, in
some cases, prepared memoranda of what they said. Nine months
after the accident, petitioner, administrator of the estate of one
of the deceased crewmen, brought suit against the owners of the
tug and the car-float. The petitioner sought discovery of the oral
and written statements secured by the counsel for the tug owners
2

Discovery is available not only as to specific information within the
adversary's possession, but extends to the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of relevant facts and to the existence and location of books,
documents, and other tangible things. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
3See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL Comers §81, at 312 (1963).
4 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The work-product privilege
should be distinguished from the attorney-client privilege, the purpose of
which is to promote full disclosure of information between an attorney and

his client by holding the confidential communication inviolate. The workproduct privilege only requires that such material be withheld from adversaries. See Fey v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 19 F.R.D. 526 (D. Neb. 1956).
Thus, where different attorneys are representing parties with a common
interest, such as possible co-defendants, and they meet and discuss material
that would otherwise be privileged, it seems that the work-product privilege
should still be available to either attorney as to any material discussed.
This should be so, even though the meeting might have constituted a waiver
of the attorney-client privilege. A waiver of the attorney-client privilege
should not be deemed a waiver of the work-product privilege. Contra,
Wild v. Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
5329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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in preparation for possible litigation. The district court held that
the requested matters were not privileged. 6 The court of appeals
held that the information sought was part of the work product of
the lawyer and, as such, absolutely privileged from discovery.7
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, but on a theory different
from that adopted by the court of appeals. The Court held the attorney's work-product privilege to be qualified, not absolute, a
balancing of competing interests being required in each case. 8 It
was noted that relevant, non-privileged information which is essential to the preparation of one's case may be discovered even though
it is in the attorney's files. 9 The Court stated that the general
policy militating against invasion into the privacy of an attorney's
preparation for trial places on the party seeking to invade that
privacy the burden of establishing adequate reasons to justify disclosure.' 0 Here, the petitioner had failed to make a showing of
purported necessity or justification. It is important to note that
the question of whether there is a distinction between materials
gathered by lawyers and materials gathered by non-lawyers, in
regard to the work-product privilege, was not answered in Hickman.
The work-product privilege would seem clearly to apply to
material gathered by a lawyer. However, mere membership in
the bar is not sufficient to render information privileged. Either
the material must have been obtained as a result of a basic professional relationship between the lawyer and the client or the
gathering process must have required the training, skill and
knowledge of a lawyer." Where the attorney performs services
akin to those rendered by an investigator or claims agent, and
occupies no professional relationship to the party represented, the
Furthermore, the privilege will only
immunity will not arise.'2
arise when the information sought has been acquired in preparation for trial.' s
479 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
212 (3d Cir. 1945).
8 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 497 (1947). The two competing
interests are the precluding of unwarranted excursions into a man's work
and the need for reasonable and necessary inquiries.
9 Id. at 511-12.
o Id. at 512. "Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can
justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of
an attorney." Id. at 510.
"'United States v. Anderson, 34 F.RD. 518, 521 (D. Colo. 1963).
' 2 Bifferato v. States Marine Corp., 11 F.R.D. 44, 46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
",E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D.
416, 420-21 (D. Del. 1959). Where the information has been obtained in
the regular course of the defendant's business, the privilege will not attach.
E.g., Colden v. P-J. Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521, 522 (N.D. Ohio 1952);
Bifferato v. States Marine Corp., 11 F.R.D. 44, 46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
In addition, statements made antecedent to the commencement of the
action, not in anticipation of prospective litigation, although not obtained
in the regular course of business, are not privileged. Ridiker v. Warfield,
11 F.R.D. 125, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
64 F.R.D.
7 153 F.2d
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An interesting case in this 4regard is Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.,' where the plaintiff sought discovery of a memorandum prepared by one of the defendant's lawyers for the defendant's use in a previous action in which the
plaintiff here was not a party. The vital information contained
in the memorandum could not be obtained by the plaintiff except
by discovery of the memorandum. The court held that there was
no privilege which would preclude discovery of a lawyer's memorandum, prepared during a prior case, in a subsequent action between different parties. This case seemingly places the attorney
for a defendant who is liable to a class of persons in an anomalous position, in that matter obtained in preparation for litigation
of a suit brought by a member of a class might not be privileged
in a second suit relating to the same transaction initiated by a
different member of the same class, since it was not prepared in
anticipation of the subsequent suit. It seems illogical for the
privilege not to extend to the same defendant when he is sued
a second time by a different plaintiff on a claim arising out of
the same transaction or occurrence. It would have been clearer,
perhaps, for the court in this case to have found that a privilege
was vital and
existed but was overcome because the information
15
could have been obtained only through discovery.'
In addition to the question of whether the material was prepared in anticipation of the suit in which discovery is sought, an
inquiry is sometimes made into the time at which the information
was obtained. Clearly, where the information sought is obtained
prior to the accrual of the cause of action, the privilege should
not attach, since it could not possibly have been prepared in anticipation of litigation.' 6 It has been suggested that a cut-off date
corresponding to the date of commencement of the action should
be applied and that all material thereafter obtained should be
However,
absolutely privileged and not subject to discovery."
the Hickman rationale of qualified privilege would appear to make
such a cut-off date unjustified. Indeed, the cut-off date concept
has apparently been rejected.' 8
14207 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Pa. 1962).
- For criticism of this rule, see Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HAnv. L. REv. 940, 1044-45 (1961). For a further insight into
the problem, see Insurance Co. of North America v. Union Carbide Co.,
35 F.R.D. 520 (D. Colo. 1964), where it was held that adversary counsel
in an active case should not be permitted to obtain the carte blanche
privilege to examine the attorneys in a former closely related case, albeit
between different parties.
IGMclanus v. Harkness, 11 F.RD. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
'7Cf. Revheim v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., 2 F.P.D. 361
S.D.N.Y. 1942); Byers Theatres, Inc. v. Murphy, 1 F.R.D. 286, 289
W.D. Va. 1940). But see Stark v. American Dredging Co., 3 F.RLD. 300,
301 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
is See, e.g., Burns v. New York Cent. R, 33 F.R.D. 309 (N.D. Ohio

1963).
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It has been contended, and rightly so, that the proper inquiry should not focus on the date the material was obtained, but
rather on whether the material is within the scope of the workproduct doctrine. 19 Whether written statements of a witness are
within the work-product doctrine is not entirely clear although
such statements were the matter held to be privileged in the
Hickman case. Cases subsequent to Hickman have asserted that
such statements, when obtained in preparation for trial, are normally privileged as the work product of an attorney.20 However,
it has been held that since the doctrine only applies where legal
talent and training are exercised, the written statement of a witness which records his mental impressions and observations, and
not those of the attorney, should not be privileged. 21 Nevertheless, a counsel's written memorandum of oral statements of a witness is normally a part of his work product, since it necessarily
22
includes his analysis and impression of what he has heard.
Closely related to the issue of whether the written statements
of a witness are within the privilege is the question of whether
responses to a questionnaire sent out by an attorney are privileged.
In United States v. Swift & Co., 23 an anti trust case, the defendant sought disclosure of all responses received in answer to the
questionnaires sent out by the government. The court, recognizing that the Hickman rationale sought to protect the attorney's
mental processes, strategy and legal theories evolved in preparation
for trial, held that no privilege attached to the responses. Since
the materials sought were statements in writing prepared and
supplied by those responding to the questionnaire, the court ruled
the work-product doctrine inapplicable. Because a copy of the
questionnaire was available to the moving party, the only work
which could be claimed by the government to be privileged was
the routine clerical tasks of circulation and receipt of the ques10 Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparations in the Federal Cnurts, 50
CoLum.
L. REv. 1026, 1039-41 (1950).
2
oSee, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 32 F.R.D.
350 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Bohlin v. Brass Rail, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 224 (S.D.N.Y.
1957); Tandy & Allen Constr. Co. v. Peerless Cas. Co., 20 F.R.D. 223
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); Snyder v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Thompson v. Hoitsma, 19 F.R.D. 112 (D.N.J. 1956); Sturm v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 16 F.R.D. 476 (D. Conn. 1954). A proposed 1946
amendment to the federal rules would have given an absolute immunity to
the mental impressions, conclusions or opinions of the attorney. Report of
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts
of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 456-57 (1946).
21Smith v. Washington Gas & Light Co., 7 F.R.D. 735 (D.D.C. 1948).
This would seem to apply whether the statement was prepared by the witness
and later delivered to the attorney or drafted by the attorney and later
adopted by the witness, so long as the attorney did not edit the statement.
Lundberg v. Willis, 11 F.R.D. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).

22 Id.
2324 F.R.D. 280 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
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tionnaires. The court here noted that in order for such litigation
to be manageable, full disclosure must be allowed; that this is
not a situation where specific witnesses are within the personal
knowledge of the movant and equally available to be interviewed;
and that to compel the movant to duplicate the effort of his adversary would be time-consuming and expensive and would not
provide a sound basis for analyzing the statistical results of an
opponent's survey or its probative value. Where, however, legal
skill is required to frame the questionnaire and the questions have
not been disclosed, an argument can be made against requiring
disclosure. Several recent cases have held that such responses
are within the privilege.2 4 Nevertheless, it is contended that the
rationale of the court in Swift should control. Of course, disclosure should not be allowed as to the reports and compilations
of the responses, since they necessarily reflect the mental impressions and work of the attorney.
Another problematic area is that of the discovery of photographs or diagrams made shortly after the occurrence out of which
the claim arose. Whether these are privileged is not entirely
clear,2r even where they have been made under the supervision of
an attorney. In some situations, legal skill may be involved in
taking such pictures or preparing diagrams, and the privilege
should attach. 26 The question of whether the privilege attaches
to contemporaneous pictures or diagrams, on the other hand, is
rather academic. Since they cannot be duplicated, the courts will
order disclosure, even though they are privileged,
as "good cause"
7
sufficient to overcome the privilege exists3
The question of whether or not to extend the work-product
privilege to material obtained by those working in conjunction
with a lawyer is a vexing one, particularly because the Hickman
decision was based on the unique role of the attorney in our system of jurisprudence and because it involved only statements
obtained by the defendant's attorney. The question is one of
considerable practical significance to the lawyer who cannot do all
the investigative work required for litigation himself. The question has caused a split among, as well as within, the circuits.
24

United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523, 527-28 (D. Minn. 1949).
In United States v. American Optical Co., 37 F.R.D. 233 (E.D. Wis. 1965),
it was held that such responses are clearly within the Hickmant rationale.
Sec United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 34 F.R.D. 241, 243 (E.D.
Mo. 1963).
2SCompare Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 7 F.R.D.
132 (W.D. Mich. 1945) (discovery denied), with Atlantic Greyhound Corp.
v. Lauritzen,
182 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1950) (discovery granted).
2
6Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 7 F.R.D. 132 (W.D.

Mich. 1945).
27 Scuderi v. Boston Ins. Co., 34 F.RD. 463 (D.Del. 1964) (averment
of inaccessibility of documents ruled insufficient to overcome privilege).
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In Alltmont v. United States,28 disclosure was sought of
statements of witnesses obtained by agents of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. The government resisted discovery, contending
that the material represented the work product of government
lawyers. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, after noting that
Hickman only concerned statements obtained by a lawyer, held
that "its rationale has a much broader sweep and applies to all
statements of prospective witnesses which a party has obtained
for his trial counsel's use."'2 9 The court thought it would be
illogical to distinguish between statements of a witness obtained
by the attorney himself and those obtained by others for the use
of counsel - in both situations, the material is obtained in preparation for trial and ultimately becomes part of the attorney's
file for use at the impending trial.
While some courts have agreed with the Alltmont court,30
others have denied the privilege.3 1 Indeed, there is considerable
authority that such reports are not privileged. In United States
v. McKay,82 the government sought disclosure of reports relating
to a testator's property from the executor. The reports had been
obtained by the executor for the purpose of advising and adequately representing the estate and in anticipation of possible
estate tax litigation. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused
to impose a privilege under the work-product doctrine, stating
that the reports in question were in no sense the work product
of an attorney but were solely the work product of an expert
witness employed by the lawyer.
In addition to this factor militating against extending the
privilege, it can be argued that the Alltmont case was based on the
premise that free discovery of the work of claims agents and investigators would favor the party whose attorney does his own
preparation over the party whose lawyer delegates part of this task
to others. The lower federal courts, however, should not, it is
believed, take this premise into consideration. 3 Even the courts
which ordinarily deny the privilege to the work of laymen would
grant the privilege where the investigator's work contains material
in the nature of opinion, theory or recommendation as opposed to
177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950).
976.
.g., Slifka Fabrics v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 19 F.R.D. 374
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); Snyder v. United States, 20 F.RD. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
31
E.g., Brown v. New York, N.H. & Hart R.IL, 17 F.R.D. 324
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Szymanski v. New York, N.H. & Hart. ILL, 14 F.RLD.
82 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 385 (W.D. Ark.
1953).
32372 F2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967).
33 Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); C. WhIGHT, FmmuL COuRTs §82, at 315 (1963).
28

29
Id.at
30
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mere factual data, since it partakes of the nature of an attorney's
work in preparation for litigation. 4
A strong argument can, on the other hand, be made for
so extending the privilege. In United States v. American Optical
Co.,39 it was stated that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents
were no more than the instrumentalities through which the government attorneys acted in their professional capacity and that the
memoranda and reports of such agents are as much the workproduct of the government's attorneys as the memoranda or
statements prepared or obtained by the attorneys themselves.36 The
court distinguished the reports made here from routine reports of
claims agents and investigators,3 7 civilian or governmental, made in
the regular course of business.
If this case is extended to apply to civilian agents, whenever
they perform non-routine investigative functions which are the
same as might be done by the lawyer himself and the work involves the inherent privilege of the legal profession, the privilege will
probably attach. Although the threat of discovery of material
obtained by an agent might less readily undermine counsel's trial
preparation than would such a threat if directed at the counsel's
own work, it is possible that an attorney might decide to wait
and see what his adversary's agents turn up before spending his
client's funds. Furthermore, this threat might make counsel bear
more of the burden of trial preparation himself, including routine
tasks, so as to keep the unearthed facts from discovery. This
might leave him less time for work involving more legal talent
and therefore impede "effective preparation." 38
It is therefore believed that where the agent is acting under
the direction and control of the attorney and is performing the
same function that the attorney would otherwise perform, the
results of his labor should be privileged under the work-product
doctrine. To hold otherwise would require an attorney either to
do all the work himself or disclose the material to his adversary
free of charge. An amendment to the federal rules was recommended, but not adopted, which would have extended a qualified
immunity to any writing obtained or prepared by "the adverse
party, his attorney . . . or agent in anticipation of litigation or in
preparation for trial . . ." unless the movant established special

circumstances.39

34
E.g., California v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 261 (N.D. Cal. 1961);
Virginia Metal Prods. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 10 F.R.D.
374 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
3537 F.R.D. 233 (E.D. Wis. 1965).

so Id.at 238.

371d. at 237-38.
38 Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REV. 940,

1031 (1961).

39 Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States, supra note 20.
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Not infrequently, lawsuits are handled on a defendant's behalf by his liability insurer. Certainly, where the insurance company retains a lawyer to represent its insured, he should enjoy
the same immunity as independent counsel would enjoy.40 In
many instances, the insured will submit a statement to his insurer
relating to the accident involved. Where this statement is made
for the specific use of counsel, at the request of counsel, and in
anticipation of litigation, it has been held to come within the
purview of the work-product privilege,4' but where the accident
report is made by the insured to the insurer as a matter of
course,
42
Simiit cannot be considered the work-product of his attorney.
larly, the insurance company itself will often investigate the cause
of the accident. The question of whether the privilege extends to
statements obtained by investigators for the insurance company is
unresolved. 43 Where the investigation is not done in the ordinary
course of business, but in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial, and it is done under the direction and control of
the attorney for the insured, then the same considerations that
govern in determining whether an agent's reports are privileged
should govern here.
Another issue in the area of work done by one not an attorney is whether a qualified privilege should extend to material obtained or prepared by a party or his agent. Where the material
is obtained by the party or his agent prior to consultation with
an attorney, in no sense can it be stated to be the attorney's work
product.44 However, where a meeting has been held between the
attorney and his client in preparation for trial, the work-product
doctrine bars discovery of the client's mental impressions of the
conversations, since disclosure might reveal the protected mental

40
Fey v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 19 F.R.D. 526 (D. Neb. 1956). In Hicki n, the lawyer involved was retained by both the tug owners and their
insurers.
41Helverson v. J.J. Newberry & Co., 16 F.R.D. 330 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
42 Gottlieb v. Bresler, 24 F.R.D. 371 (D.D.C.
1959). The attorneyclient privilege also will not protect such a report Id. at 372.
43 Conpare Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. American Cyanamid
Co., 11 F.R.D. 306 (W.D. Mo. 1951), and Browner v. Firemen's Ins. Co.,
9 F.R.D. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), with Diniero v. United States Lines Co.,
21 F.RD. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), and BLxier v. Proctor Academy, 15 F.R.D.
503 (D.N.H. 1954). A proposed 1946 amendment to the federal rules would
have given a qualified immunity to any writing prepared or obtained by
a party's insurer. Supra note 20.
44Tfe proposal that the memorandum prepared by a party after interviewing several witnesses should be privileged as the attorney's work-product was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Groover, Christie & Merritt v. LoBianco, 336 F2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Cf. Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 24 F.R.D. 493 (M.D.N.C. 1960),
rev'd on other grounds-, 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962).
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impressions of the attorney.4 5 But if the work is done after reten-

tion of counsel, and the party acts upon the suggestion of counsel,
it is contended that the party should be considered an agent of
the attorney for investigative purposes and the considerations governing whether the privilege extends to an agent should therefore
govern.
In addition to the already mentioned problems found in applying the work-product privilege, a problem also exists with regard
to expert testimony, a common factor at trial. Normally, an expert will give an attorney a report concerning his findings and conclusions prior to trial. The cases go both ways on whether to
extend the work-product privilege to this area. 46 It is unfortunate
that the cases denying discovery do not weigh any relevant factors,
47
The considbut merely label the expert an "assistant counsel."
docwork-product
of
the
extension
erations which militate for the
trine to the agent working under the direction and control of the
attorney should not control here. Since the attorney cannot perform these tasks, there is no fear that he will not expend a proper
effort on other parts of his case to prevent discovery of expert
conclusions. If, however, permitting discovery would tend to
discourage both parties from seeking expert advice, then the privilege should apply in order that the parties will not be deprived
of this potential benefit. The privilege should not be extended if
expert opinion was a necessity, for then the attorney would be
forced to seek it even though discoverable. On the other hand,
where it is desirable but not necessary, perhaps the fear of discov-

ery would militate against the use of an expert by one party and,
therefore, the privilege should apply. The possible extension of
the privilege should be weighed against the possible effect allowing discovery would have on the use of highly partisan reports
of experts.48 Professor Moore feels experts' reports should be

given a qualified privilege

-

discovery should not be granted

unless the movant can show a need for obtaining the facts or
45 Ceco Steel Prods. Corp. v. H. K. Porter Co., 31 F.R.D. 142 (N.D.
Ill. 1962). See 15 STAN. L. REv. 718, 723 (1963). But see Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 504 (1947), where it was stated, in dictum, that a
party clearly cannot refuse to answer interrogatories on the ground that
the information sought is solely within the knowledge of his attorney.
46 Compare United States v. 6.82 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 195 (D.N.M.
1955), with E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959). A proposed 1946 amendment to the federal rules would have resolved the problem by giving the expert's report a
qualified privilege. Report of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil
Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 457
(1946).
47See, e.g., Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7
F.R.D. 684, 687 (D. Mass. 1947).
isNote, Developments in the Lazw--Discovery, 74 HtAv. L. REv. 940,
1031-32 (1961).
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information contained therein for his trial preparations and inability of obtaining the material by his own independent investigation or research. In addition, he urges that the court should
have the discretion to order the movant to pay a reasonable portion of the fees of the expert as a condition to discovery. 9
Good Cause
If the material in question does constitute the work-product
of an attorney, it may nevertheless be subject to discovery upon
a showing of good cause, i.e., a special showing of necessity or
justification. This good cause requirement should be distinguished
from the degree of proof of necessity required to obtain material
which is not privileged, which requires a lesser burden.50 Since
most of the decisions construing what constitutes good cause
represent the opinions of particular trial judges responding to the
facts and circumstances of the particular case, the decisions are
not readily generalized and at most furnish a rough guide. 51
One of the most significant factors in determining whether
sufficient necessity or justification has been shown is whether
the movant can otherwise obtain the information sought. Where
one party has superior knowledge as to the sources of relevant
information, a motion under rule 26(b) can be made to obtain
the names and addresses of all persons having knowledge as to
the dispute and the location Of documents or other tangible things.
Thus, where the movant is unable to locate witnesses previously
examined by the opposing party, although the movant has diligently attempted to do so, his adversary will be required to furnish the material sought. 52 Where the movant is unable to take
the deposition of a witness who is unavailable, e.g., he is serving
53
in the armed forces, his statement will be ordered produced.
Conversely, where the witness is available to the movant, his
statement will not be ordered to be produced unless there are
other factors involved. 54 It also appears that where witnesses are
without the state, the added expense of taking their depositions,
in and of itself, will not be a sufficient showing of good cause to
494 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §26.24, at 1531 (2d ed. 1966).
See
also mtpra note 48.
50 Crowe v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 29 F.R.D. 148 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
512 A.W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
at 146 (C. Wright ed. 1961).
§ 652.4,
52
Hanson v. Gartland S.S. Co., 34 F.R.D. 493 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
53McDonald v. Prowdley, 38 F.R.D. 1 (W.D. Mich. 1965).
54Allen v. Denver Chicago Trucking Co., 32 F.ILD. 616 (W.D. Mo.
1963). Here the plaintiff in a wrongful death action sought to obtain a
statement of a witness given to his adversary. The special factor involved
here was that, although the plaintiff had taken a deposition of this witness,
the decedent was unable to investigate or testify.
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overcome the privilege.55 Assuming that the deposition of the
witness given to the movant would be substantially the same as
that given to his adversary, it appears that the thrust of the workproduct doctrine is that it is better to have two diligent attorneys
than one.56 Thus, where the movant is without funds to conduct
an investigation and the witnesses are without the state, it seems
that the court should grant disclosure in the interests of justice
and thus help to ensure a correct result. Since the party cannot
afford to investigate, there is no possibility that the lawyer has
merely neglected to investigate.5 7 Nevertheless, expense is not
5s
ordinarily considered to be a sufficient ground for disclosure.
in
kept
being
With the thrust of the work-product doctrine
mind, it has been held that where the movant can show hostility
or lack of cooperation on the part of a witness, disclosure will be
ordered. 9 The mere fact, however, that the witness whose statement is sought is an employee of the adversary of itself is not
sufficient to require disclosure. 0 But, where the movant can
show that the witness-employee refuses to respond to his requests
for a statement, 1 or is reluctant to speak freely with him or is
openly hostile, 2 disclosure will be ordered. Similarly, disclosure
of a statement of a witness will not normally be granted to aid
the movant in his examination of the witness. 3 However, production of prior written statements will be ordered when the
witness refuses to state in the deposition whether the prior written statement is in agreement with the facts stated in the deposition. 4 A fortiori, production will be ordered where the witness
is unable to state if there is a conflict because he fails to remember significant details about the accident. 5
Where the adversary has taken statements of witnesses almost
contemporaneously with the occurrence, production will be ordered
5
Berger v. Central Vt. Ry., 8 F.R.D. 419 (D. Mass. 1948). The
court suggested that the movant examine the witness through the mail.
G6 Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 48, at 1034.
5 Cf. Naylor v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 10 F.R.D. 128 (S.D.N.Y.
1950).
State statutes enabling persons to proceed as "poor persons" usually only
furnish the indigent an attorney and a free stenographic transcript. See,
e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 1101.
58
See Gebbard v. Isbrandtsen Co., 10 F.R.D. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)
(alternate holding).
5o Hanson v. Gartland S.S. Co., 34 F.R.D. 493 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Diamond v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 33 F.R.D. 264 (D. Colo. 1963). But see
United States v. American Optical Co., 37 F.R.D. 233 (E.D. Wis. 1965).
80 Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962).

61

3 Burns v. New York Cent. R.R., 33 F.R.D. 309 (N.D. Ohio 1963).

62Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921
83McDonald v. Prowdley, 38 F.R.D. 1, 2 (W.D.
84 Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45, 53
sHanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,

(M.D. Pa. 1962).

(4th Cir. 1962).
Mich. 1965).
(4th Cir. 1963).
207 F. Supp. 407
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on the grounds that such statements, in addition to being extremely valuable, are irreplaceable.6 6 In order to obtain discovery
in this circumstance, the movant will also have to show inability
to examine the witnesses until weeks or months later. For example, in one case where the movant obtained statements within
six to nine days after the accident, disclosure was denied as to
statements made the day after the accident.6 7 Similarly, photographs and diagrams made contemporaneously with the accident
are subject to disclosure since they cannot be duplicated. 68 The
premise that the statement closest in time to the occurrence wil
be more accurate is amply supported by psychological studies and
common sense. It therefore seems that excusable lapse of time
in itself creates sufficient good cause to overcome the attorney's
work-product privilege.6 9
Finally, statements made by a witness to an attorney are
extremely valuable to the adversary for possible impeachment purposes. Generally, disclosure is granted if the statements would
be valuable for impeachment or corroboration.7 0 The movant must,
however, be able to show that the statements would impeach the
71
witness who made them, a mere surmise not being sufficient.
Absent this showing, it is generally considered that the movant
merely wants the statements to either assist in his examination
72
of the witness so as to be sure that he has overlooked nothing,
73
or to merely assist him in preparing his case, both grounds
being insufficient to justify production. This appears to be illogical since the movant will be unable to show that74the statements
are impeaching without having seen the statements.
Appealability of Discovery Orders
The general rule in the federal courts is that an appeal lies
only from a "final" judgment.7 1 Work-products orders are rarely
E6eParla v. Matson Navigation Co., 28 F.R.D. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
67 Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962).

But68see Helverson v. J.J. Newberry Co., 16 F.R.D. 330 (W.D. Mo. 1954).

Scuderi v. Boston Ins. Co., 34 F.R.D. 463, 468 (D. Del. 1964).

C. WRIGHT, FDERAL. COURTS § 82, at 318 (1963).
oSeven-Up Co. v. Get-Up Corp., 30 F.R.D. 550 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
71 Hanger v. Chicago, Rock Island & P. R.R., 216 F.2d 501, 505 (7th

69

7

Cir. 1954).
72Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947).
73

Hauger v. Chicago, Rock Island & P. R.R., 216 F.7d 501, 505 (7th

Cir. 41954).

7 See Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 32 F.R.D. 350
(E.D.
Pa. 1962), wherein the judge took a witness' statement conditionally
merely to determine what, if any, discrepancies existed between it and the
testimony given in a deposition. The judge, however, had serious misgivings about such a procedure because of the burden it would place on
the courts and accordingly expressly limited the case to the particular facts.

7528 U.S.C. § 1291 (1966).
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1966)
from a narrowly limited class of interlocutory orders.

permits appeal
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reviewed in the courts of appeals, and when they are, jurisdiction
is not predicated on the ground that the order was final, review
being had via a writ of mandamus.70 Denial of immediate review
is based on the ground that the issue may be raised on appeal
from the final judgment on the merits-impliedly suggesting that
such review is adequate protection or that the policies of the
finality doctrine outweigh the possibilities of injury resulting from
denial of interlocutory review. As a practical matter, if an order
denying discovery is urged as error on appeal from a final judgment, a reversal will be granted only if the order is erroneous and
probably affects the merits.Y It is difficult to see how a petitioner
can prove prejudice due to a denial of discovery without seeing
the material. Where the order grants discovery, the question is
moot if there is compliance. Therefore, it seems that final review
affords little protection to one seeking or opposing discovery. It
is therefore apparent that the attorney should seek to obtain interlocutory review of discovery orders. The problem then is how
this can be done within the present statutory framework.
In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,75 a shareholder's derivative suit, the defendant moved to require the plaintiff
to furnish security for expenses and attorney's fees. The United
States Supreme Court held the denial of the motion to be appealable, since the "decision appears to fall in that small class which
finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to,
rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review
and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 79
Therefore, where the issue disposed of by the district court is
collateral to the subject matter of the litigation and denial of interlocutory appeal will tend to expose a person to potential irreparable injury,80 an immediate appeal is allowed. Based on the
collateral issue doctrine, an order denying discovery as to information in the possession of a witness, who is not a party to the
action, will be held final and appealable if the main action for
which the evidence is sought is pending in another circuitS1 The
critical fact is that the unsuccessful movant has no other possibility
7GAmerican Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica

Ins. Co., 380

F.2d 277, 281, 283-84 (2d Cir. 1967).
77Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV.L. Ray. 940, 993
(1961).
78337 U.S. 541 (1949).
79Id. at 546.

80As to irreparable injury, the Court stated that: "[w]hen that time
[of final judgment] comes, it will be too late effectively to review the
present order, and the rights conferred by the statute, if it is applicable,
will have been lost, probably irreparably." Id. at 546. See Overby v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 224 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1955).
8"Carter Prods., Inc. v. Eversharp, Inc., 360 F2d 868 (7th Cir. 1966).
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of review. Also, where the order, if not appealed, will result in
the termination of
2 the action, appeal should be allowed under the
Cohen rationale.
The denial or granting of a discovery order may cause irreparable harm and, therefore, the Cohen rationale, justifying immediate
appeal of a collateral order which neither affects nor is affected
by judgment on the merits, may be applicable. However, in light
of American
Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. TransamericaInsurance
Co., 83 this possibility seems unlikely. The second circuit, in denying review of an interlocutory order requiring disclosure of
certain documents, explicitly rejected the view that an erroneous
application of the Hickman principle by the district court raised
a "spectre of such dire consequences" as to necessitate immediate
appellate review. The Cohen rationale, the court noted, was meant
to apply only to a "small class of cases," and "did not change
the pre-1949 practice of denying interlocutory review of discovery
orders." 84
American Express does not mean that review may never be
had. If the district court has dismissed the action or entered a
default for non-compliance with a discovery order, the order is
clearly final and appealable.8 5 In United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co.,58 at the government's request, a discovery order
directed against it was amended to provide for a dismissal with
prejudice if the government failed to comply. It failed to produce the ordered material and the district court dismissed the
action with prejudice and the government appealed. The Supreme
Court held the order to be final, but allowed the government to
bring a writ of error, finding that the government had not taken a
voluntary dismissal because it had at all times opposed the production
order and was merely seeking expeditious review. The Court indicated that had the dismissal been without prejudice, review
might not have been available.8 7 Where the dismissal is with
prejudice, it appears that risking a loss on the merits if the appeal
fails is a high price to pay for appellate review. 8
Where review is sought of a discovery order, non-compliance may result in a judgment of contempt. If the contempt
judgment is rendered against one not a party to the action, it is
82
See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966). The
trial court had dismissed a class action and the representative only had a
$70 cause of action individually. If unreviewed, the district court's order
would cause the demise of the action and, therefore, review was allowed.
83380 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1967).

841d. at 280.
85

See FFD. R. Crv. P. 37(b) (2) (iii).

86356 U.S. 677 (1958).
87 But see United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 794
n.1 (1949).
88 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958).
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reviewable as a final judgment on the merits.3 9 When against
a party, where the contempt is civil in nature with the intent to
compel compliance rather than preserve the dignity of the court,
interlocutory appeal will not lie.9 0 Only where the contempt is
criminal in nature will immediate review be available. 9' Where
the judge is sympathetic and imposes only light penalties for
criminal contempt or stays the order of sentencing pending appeal,
such can2 be a valuable method of obtaining immediate interlocutory
review.

Generally, attempts to secure interlocutory review of discovery orders by mandamus or prohibition have failed. 3 However,
in Hartley Pen Co. v. United States District Court,94 the plaintiff,
a manufacturer of pens who utilized a trade secret under a licensing agreement which prohibited its disclosure, was ordered to
disclose the trade secrets and secret test procedures. The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus or prohibition to reverse the order
as an abuse of discretion. The court granted the writ because
the ordinary remedies were inadequate and there were exceptional
and extraordinary circumstances present which required the issuance of an extraordinary writ to prevent a grave miscarriage of
justice. The court rejected arguments that the petitioner had an
adequate remedy on appeal and that he should have been required
to obtain review by failing to comply with the order and appealing
from the resulting default judgment or contempt citation.9 5 Also
to be noted in this regard is Atlass V. Miner,96 where the petitioner sought a writ of mandamus or prohibition to prevent enforcement of a discovery order, alleging that the local admiralty rule
upon which it was based was invalid and improper. Since the
court considered the question to be critical and directed at a
fundamental procedural question, resolution of which would perhaps serve to avoid a conflict among the district courts, and
thought that the remedy on appeal would be inadequate, it granted
the writ.
s9See Fenton v. Walling, 139 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1943), and cases
cited therein.
90 Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme Tank Cleaning Process Corp., 86
F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1936).
91
See Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105 (1936).
92
E.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 153 F2d
212 93 (3d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380
F.2d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 1967).
94287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961).
DsBut see Chemical & Indus. Corp. v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.
1962), denying the writ but suggesting that petitioner apply to the district
court for a protective order.
96265 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1959), aff'd on other grounds, 363 U.S. 641
(1960).
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Generally, the issues that can be raised by mandamus or prohibition are usurpation of power, clear abuse of discretion and
the presence of an issue of first impressionY7 The writ is unavailable when the most that can be claimed is that the district
court erred in ruling on matters within its jurisdiction. 9 It seems
that mandamus or prohibition, being discretionary, could be utilized to allow appeals where dearly justified, these remedies not
raising the objections of expense and delay which are inherent in
appeals as of right.
In 1958, Congress passed the Interlocutory Appeals Act 9 9 in
order to expedite the ultimate termination of litigation and thereby
save unnecessary expense and delay. 100 Under this Act, immediate appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court judge
may be obtained if that judge certifies that the order involves a
"controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion," 101 and if such appeal would hasten the
ultimate termination of the litigation.
It has been held that the correctness of an order compelling
discovery is collateral to the basic issues in a case and does not
present such a fundamental question of law as to be considered
controlling on these issues. 0 2 This holding appears unwarranted,
for, if the propriety of such an order is likely to affect the ultimate outcome of the case, it could conceivably be termed a controlling question of law. Clearly, in many instances, there will
be a substantial difference of opinion as to the issues involved.
The second requirement for an appeal under the Act is that
it must hasten the end of the law suit. If discovery is denied
and reversed on an appeal from the final judgment, a second trial
would be required. Immediate review would eliminate the necessity of two trials-an obvious saving of time. On the other hand,
where disclosure is ordered, immediate review would lengthen the
litigation. It would seem that this Act should have its greatest
vitality where issues of privilege are involved or where trade
secrets are ordered disclosed and compliance would result in irreparable injury. Since the statute is discretionary, the courts will
not be cluttered with frivolous appeals from ordinary workproduct privilege cases.

97
American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380
F.2d 277, 283 (2d Cir. 1967).
98 ld.

9928 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
100 H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85th

Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
20'H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958).
202 United States v. Woodbury, 263 F2d 784 (9th Cir. 1959).
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Conclusion
Today's discovery rules are essentially the same as those promulgated in 1938.03 The Advisory Committee, recognizing the
urgent need for amendment to resolve confusion and disagreement
present under the existing rules, has proposed several amendments
to the federal discovery rules.
The first proposal relating to the "work product" dilemma is
to eliminate the general requirement of "good cause" from rule 34,
retaining it for trial preparation materials which would be expressly
The Committee's
privileged under Proposed Rule 26(b) (3) .10
rationale is evidently to end the confusion resulting from the different1 05 requirements of good cause present under the existing
rules.
Today, there is considerable debate and confusion as to whether
the attorney's "work-product" privilege extends to materials obtained in preparation for litigation by non-lawyers as well as to
lawyers. 00 Proposed Rule 26(b) (3)107 would privilege, subject
to a showing of good cause, materials obtained in preparation of
litigation whether secured by the party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, insurer or agent. In addition, Proposed Rule 26(b) (3)
would permit discovery of a statement previously given by a party
without a showing of good cause. 08
The question of whether to permit discovery of the work of
an expert is unresolved today. The Advisory Committee, in its
Proposed Rule 26(b) (4) (A), 00 has decided that such information
should be privileged and obtainable only if the party seeking discovery is "unable without undue hardship to obtain facts and
opinions on the same subject by other means or upon a showing
of other exceptional circumstances indicating that denial of discovery would cause manifest injustice." The court under rule
26(b) (4) (C),--" is also empowered under the proposed amendment
to order the movant to pay the expert a reasonable fee for his
time in responding to discovery and also to provide for a sharing
of the expert's fee.
03
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These proposed rules would undoubtedly aid in the resolution
of the confusion that exists under today's rules relating to discovery
of the attorney's "work product" and perhaps end the influx of
numerous discovery cases into the district courts.

M
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TAx HoME

CONCEPT

Section 63(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 defines
taxable income as gross income minus certain -deductions. Among
these deductions are listed all ordinary and necessary traveling expenses incurred while away from home in pursuit of a trade or
business." Whereas "away from home" seems a simple enough
concept for even the layman to comprehend, it has caused a plethora of problems for the courts and for the Internal Revenue
Service. Cases have developed in two separate areas of the law
in order to arrive at a practical definition of "away from home."
One line of cases has sought a meaning for the term "home" and
thus has developed the "tax home" concept. 2 The second line of
cases has focused on what "away" means as used in its statutory
context.
In order to understand the present situation in this area and
the direction in which the law is moving, it is necessary to develop
each of these two areas separately. It seems plausible to begin
with the term "home" and the way in which Congress, the courts
and the Internal Revenue Service have construed it. Special emphasis in this area will be given to Commissioner v. Stidger,3 the
most recent Supreme Court pronouncement concerning the "tax
home" doctrine. Then, with at least a workable understanding of
the "tax home" concept, the discussion will proceed to the related
problem of how "away" is to be interpreted under the statute.
Tax Home
A deduction for travel expenses, including all expenditures for
meals and lodging, was first included in Section 214(a) of the
Revenue Act of 1921.4 Previously, Treasury Regulations promul-

I INT.

REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (2).
2See Note, A Renewed Assault on the Tax Home Doctrine, 20 Sw.
L.J. 676 (1966).

3386 U.S. 287 (1967).

§ 214(a) (1), 42 Stat. 227.
That in computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(1) . . . traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit
of a trade or business.

4 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136,

